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Recent terrorist attacks in cities such as London, Paris, and New York reveal a diversity in 
methods, level of organization and background factors (e.g., age, level of training, and foreign 
or homegrown terrorism). This diversity underlines a need for tailored interventions 
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Abstract 
Many interventions aim to tackle violent radicalization. Monitoring the 
implementation of interventions results in a better identification of effective 
interventions and in a more appropriate selection of applicable interventions for 
practitioners. Using meta-analytic and network analytic methods, we present a 
method to store and retrieve information about countering (violent) extremism 
(CVE) interventions using a knowledge base that allows for different searches for 
relevant information. We describe the construal of this knowledge base using data 
on 99 European CVE interventions. Subsequently, we present inferences that can 
be drawn from this sample. Key determinants to identify whether radicalizing 
people are eligible for participating in CVE interventions were found to be 
friendship relations, group affiliation and available intelligence. Dependent on the 
ideology targeted by the CVE intervention different goals and mechanisms were 
identified. Information on financial costs of CVE interventions was often not 
available in open sources. Implications of representing the information on CVE 
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countering extreme radicalization, as a single cause of violent extremism is thought to be 
unlikely2. Relevant causes and triggers include a variety of socio-psychological, political, and 
ideological aspects, trigger mechanisms, and group dynamics (Doosje, Moghaddam, 
Kruglanski, de Wolf, Mann, & Feddes, 2016; Gielen, 2017; Schuurman, 2018).  
CVE intervention program experts are often aware that trying to incorporate all 
sources of violent extremism is neither necessary nor realistic. A guiding question for CVE 
intervention programs could be ‘what works for whom’. However, information about the 
effectiveness of CVE intervention programs is scarce. In a study on evaluations of CVE 
interventions, empirical evidence about effectiveness of interventions was found to be absent 
in 88% of participant samples (Feddes and Gallucci, 2015). This points to a need for studies 
focusing on empirical evaluations as well as for more structured information about aspects of 
CVE interventions that could play a role in evaluations and effectiveness. For example, a 
relevant question is what led institutions (not) to pursue a specific CVE intervention. The goal 
of the present paper is two-fold: a. to present a manner in which relevant information about 
CVE interventions can be structured and retained, and b. to present sample outcomes that can 
be derived from such a structured approach.  
One initiative of the European Union has been to facilitate local or subnational 
practitioners to exchange good practices of CVE interventions, for example in the 
Radicalisation Awareness Network3. This initiative has been praised, but also -partly- 
criticized because it bypasses scientific rigor, evidence and evaluations that are important to 
base policy decisions on (Bossong, 2014). Aim of this paper is to investigate to what extent a 
method for constructing a knowledge base on CVE interventions is viable and helps to adhere 
more to scientific rigor in sharing information on CVE interventions. 
Progress in digital technology has led to searchable databases using knowledge 
management. Knowledge management is “the coordination and linking of many knowledge 
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sources” (p.6, Johnson & Sabourin, 2001). A first step in knowledge management is 
developing a knowledge base of related and searchable data and making explicit which 
knowledge is relevant. Compared to information sharing and descriptive reviews, knowledge 
bases have important advantages. Searchable knowledge bases allow for a systematic and 
dynamic representation of information, whilst retaining the ability to consider further detail. 
In contrast, descriptive (literature) reviews have limits on the quantity of information 
included; authors need to choose which information (not) to include. Often, it is a choice 
between information specificity and breadth of scope. However, for judgments of intervention 
applicability, detailed information of a large number of interventions is required (Yardley, 
Morrison, Bradbury & Muller, 2015). Details are important for experts who try to apply 
knowledge learnt from previous CVE interventions. Examples of such details are how 
interventions are carried out, which group is the target of interventions, or which geographical 
region is selected.  
Existing knowledge- and databases on radicalization focus mostly on terrorist actors or 
incidents (e.g., on global incidents, Dugan, LaFre, Cragin & Kasupski, 20084; on right-wing 
terrorism and extremism in Germany, Koehler, 2014). The quality of these knowledge bases 
varies. For example, they are sometimes based on source data that fail to meet academic 
standards (Bhui, Hicks, Lashley & Jones, 2012; Koehler, 2014). For a recent overview of 
databases on terrorist and related events see Bowie (2017). Information on interventions is 
available in five of the 60 databases in this overview5:  
• The Comprehensive Database of African Counter-Terrorism Law and Policy focuses 
on (new) laws and legislations in Africa (https://issafrica.org/ctafrica/african-national-
legislation). 
                                                 
4 Dugan, L., LaFre, G., Cragin, K., & Kasupski, A. (2008). Building And Analyzing A Comprehensive Open Source Data 










van den Berg, van Hemert & van Vliet: Creating a Knowledge Base for Interventions 






• The Countermeasures against Extremism and Terrorism (CoMET) database focuses on 
governmental and non-governmental actors against UK Home-grown Islamic Violent 
Extremists (HIVE-UK), al-Qaida in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM) and Anti-Abortion 
Extremists (AAE) in the United States. This knowledge base provides a descriptive 
overview of an intervention and its methodology, including the timeframe. Links to 
relevant websites are provided (http://www.start.umd.edu//news/new-database-
provides-insights-terrorism-countermeasures). 
• The Counter-Terrorism Initiatives (African Union) Resource Database focus on policy 
making intervention initiatives 
(http://www.canadianglobalsecurity.com/project/ctiau/).  
• The international Policy Institute for Counter-Terrorism provides the ICT’s Incidents 
and Activists Database, which contains counter terrorism related news and regional 
developments 
(http://www.ict.org.il/ResearchPublications/DatabaseReports/tabid/380/Default.aspx).  
• The Terrorism, Counterterrorism and Radicalisation (Research Database) contains 
terrorism, counterterrorism and radicalization projects underway in the Netherlands. 
As of 2011, this database is no longer maintained due to financing issues 
(http://www.terrorismdata.leiden.edu). 
Most, if not all of these databases do not include a systematic account of the structure and 
content of interventions. To fill the gap in available databases on non-policy aspects of 
interventions, we propose a knowledge base of CVE interventions that draws on a detailed 
analysis of interventions. It informs about (the design of) interventions and gives a systematic 
account of the structure and content of interventions. Depending on the expertise, 
professionals dealing with CVE interventions have different focal points. For practitioners on 
CVE interventions, information about fit-for-purpose interventions is relevant, such as goals 
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or target group selection. For policy makers, information about costs and effectiveness is 
relevant.  
The first part of this paper describes the construction of a systematic knowledge base 
that contains content data and relations data about interventions. The second part of this paper 
illustrates various inferences that can be drawn based on different forms of data analysis 
techniques, varying from qualitative analyses and relatively simple quantitative analyses (e.g., 
frequency counts) to more complex quantitative visualizations (e.g., network analyses). We 
start out by describing the key terms interventions and deradicalization, and some 
requirements of a systematic knowledge base. 
Within CVE, interventions are methods used to facilitate change in an individual’s 
and/or group’s behavior, emotional state, and/or cognitions (Ballou, 1995). To include 
disengagement as a type of deradicalization interventions, we define an intervention as any 
deliberate process by which the potential for change is introduced into peoples' thoughts, 
feelings and/or behaviors. We focus on interventions that aim to tackle radicalization 
processes leading to terrorism and violent extremism. Deradicalization has been described as 
‘the social and psychological process whereby an individual’s commitment to, and 
involvement in violent radicalization is reduced to the extent that they are no longer at risk of 
involvement and engagement in violent activity’ (Horgan, 2009, p.153).  
Besides defining key terms, transparency, traceability and reproducibility of data in a 
knowledge base are vital (Ioannidis et al., 2014; Munafò et al., 2017). All contents of the 
knowledge base should be traceable to its source, be it empirical research, expert opinion or 
information on a website, as a guidance of any scientific claim. Munafò et al., (2017) state on 
the credibility of scientific claims:  
“The credibility of scientific claims is rooted in the evidence supporting them, which 
includes the methodology applied, the data acquired, and the process of methodology 
implementation, data analysis and outcome interpretation. [..] without transparency, 
claims only achieve credibility based on trust in the confidence or authority of the 
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Constructing a knowledge base 
 
A combination of scientific methods from behavioral sciences including general research 
methodologies, meta-analysis, and network analysis are used as starting point. These methods 
require different but linked data. The resulting knowledge base is a combination of these data.  
To perform a meta-analysis, research reports are systematically searched and coded on many 
sample-related and study-related variables, as well as on statistical outcomes (i.e., to calculate 
effect sizes). Meta-analysis does not aim to provide true objectivity. Rather it provides an 
opportunity for shared subjectivity in reviews. Authors of meta-analyses make decisions 
based on own judgments, such as when defining the boundaries of analyses or deciding 
exactly how to code moderator variables. Meta-analyses require that these decisions are made 
public, so they are open to review and comment from other scholars (Cooper, Hedges, & 
Valentine, 2009; Hunter & Schmidt, 2004). Whereas meta-analyses usually omit data from 
non-scientific outlets, inclusion of other than scientific data is possible. 
This latter point is relevant for application to CVE interventions, because in this 
domain scientific empirical research is scarce (Feddes & Gallucci, 2015). Including non-
scientific sources in an overview on CVE interventions is therefore essential. This allows us 
to assess frequencies of occurrence in the field, (i.e., which interventions are focused on a 
certain type of ideology) and simple relationships (e.g., to what extent a certain type of 
ideology is related to a certain type of intervention) whilst retaining the option to select 
information from only scientific sources.  
Network approaches focus on relations, in this case relations between aspects of 
interventions. A network (or networks) of relations is called a content network, it can change 
dynamically, and it can ‘learn’ (Carley & Kamneva, 2004; Krackhart & Carley, 1998). This 
allows for more elaborate relationship searches and for network analysis. A content network 
can give a sophisticated overview of the many variables related to CVE interventions, and can 
as such aid in obtaining an overview of the many aspects involved. A content network 
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and relates each aspect to all other aspects in a network (Cramer, Waldorp, van der Maas, & 
Borsboom, 2010). This network can be visualized proceeding from questions at hand 
(Epskamp, Cramer, Waldorp, Schmittmann, & Borsboom, 2012). Because the structure of 
relationships can be incorporated, other forms of investigation between aspects of CVE 
interventions emerge, such as information about the relative importance of variables and 
relationships. A question for this type of data could be: In a network describing relations 
between aspects of CVE interventions, to what extent are certain aspects of CVE 
interventions central while others are more peripheral? Representing and investigating 
knowledge as relations can pinpoint issues and conclusions that guide interventions and 
evaluations, give indications of which set of CVE intervention aspects is more relevant, and 
help to decide which aspects should be targeted when trying to prevent violent acts as the 
result of radicalization. 
The knowledge base as proposed in this article has aspects of both meta-analytic and 
network-analytic studies. However, our data search and data collection were not fully 
systematic, as there is no simple way to do this with non-scientific outlets. We did follow 
meta-analytic rigor and structure, but did not use the full meta-analytic method in the sense of 
collecting effect sizes. The present search and resulting data should be informative about what 
is known about a collection of relevant CVE interventions. Table 1 gives an overview of the 
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Table 1. Type of information of the knowledge base on CVE interventions as a factor of methods and sources used  
                               Method 















Descriptive information    
 




Values (answers to 
predefined questions) 
Correlations 
Note: Meta-analysis: Coding of aspects of CVE interventions and statistical outcomes. Content network analysis: Coding of 
relations between information coded in meta-analysis. Also included in the knowledge base was the source of the information 
and the type of coded information (e.g., empirical, theoretical, expert opinion).  
 
Below we describe the steps that are needed to create a knowledge base. The steps we 
distinguish are to a large extent based on meta-analytic methods (Cooper et al., 2009), with 
additional inclusions from network analysis (Cramer et al., 2010) and general research 
methodology principles (Mook, 2001). In short, the five steps are: 
1. Determine which dimensions and relationships between dimensions to assess  
2. Determine elements and cutting points within each dimension 
3. Determine what defines relations and directions of relationships 
4. Populate the knowledge base with available data  
5. Perform analyses and visualizations  
We describe each step and the construction of the knowledge base on European 
deradicalization interventions accordingly. In the final step, we will illustrate sample analyses. 
 
Step 1. Determine which dimensions and relations to assess  
Determining which dimensions are relevant can be done in several ways. Typically, a 
longlist of potential dimensions is identified by analyzing scientific research and by 
consulting experts. A selection is made based on for example expert sessions and quantitative 
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goals and methods of interventions. An important referential dimension is a link or reference 
to original documents. Classification of the type of data (empirical data, theoretical assertions, 
or based on expert opinion) is also important.  
For the CVE interventions knowledge base, four days of guided expert sessions 
determined which dimensions of CVE interventions are of importance (see Ritchey, 2011a 
and 2011b, for information on this approach). Attending experts (e.g., practitioners, end users 
and researchers with policy making and behavioral sciences expertise) represented different 
viewpoints on the topic. The resulting selection of dimensions and elements was subjected to 
further scrutiny in a workshop with potential end users of the knowledge base. The resulting 
set of 70 relevant dimensions of interventions is divided into seven categories: 
- Problem identification refers to the use of key indicators for vulnerability and 
eligibility for intervention programmes. In other words, based on which indicators do 
professionals select an individual for inclusion in an intervention programme? 
Examples are changes in habits, changes in daily activities and certain travel 
destinations.  
- Target refers to the type of target of the intervention, such as potentially radicalized 
individuals, already radicalized individuals, friends and relatives of radicalized 
individuals and vulnerable groups. It includes information on the ideology of targets 
(for example, right-wing extremism, and Islamic extremism) and age range of the 
target group.  
- Goal refers to goals of the intervention, including mitigation of radicalization and 
repression of radical behavior (e.g., through detention).  
- Method refers to ways in which goals of the intervention are achieved, including type 
of activities applied in the program (e.g., training, counseling, and group activities), 
how the target group was involved to participate (actively, passively), key dimensions 
targeted by the intervention (e.g., identity, knowledge, skills, norms, opportunities), 






van den Berg, van Hemert & van Vliet: Creating a Knowledge Base for Interventions 






- Results and impact refer to products or impact consequences of the interventions, 
such as costs of the intervention programme, whether an evaluation was performed, 
and the level of operation of the organization (e.g., regional, national, international).  
- Resources and conditions refer to, among other things, characteristics of the 
organization applying the intervention, the developer of the intervention, and the type 
of finances that enabled the intervention.  
- Demographic aspects refers to characteristics of interventions such as year of 
implementation.  
 
Step 2. Determine elements and cutting points within each dimension  
The second step involves deciding how to code the dimensions identified in the 
previous step. Each dimension is specified in preferably exclusive categories. Categories do 
not overlap and content fits in one category only. The list of possible elements is inclusive, 
including an ‘other’ category to code exceptions. For example, runtimes of intervention 
programs can vary from hours to months or years; in the case of individually customized 
runtimes, the ‘other’ category could apply. 
Below, we describe those elements of dimensions of CVE interventions that require 
further explanation6. We identified three categories of organizations, by relating proximity of 
typical professionals in these organizations to the ultimate target group of the intervention 
(e.g., vulnerable individual, families): 1) Policy makers with no direct contact with target 
groups but direct contact with professionals. Typically, they work for municipality, province 
or the government; 2) Professionals who have direct contact with front line workers but no 
direct contact with target groups. Typically, they work in research and development or train 
the trainer; 3) Professionals who have direct contact with target groups. These include 
policemen and social workers. 
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Based on a diverse array of expertise, seven ideologies that intervention programs aim 
at were identified: national separatists, right-wing, left wing, Islamic, ecological, anti-
globalist, and interventions not specifically targeting one specific ideology, which we will 
further refer to as ‘not ideologically oriented extremism’.  
Bases for assessing vulnerability and eligibility for intervention programs were coded 
by key indicators or changes thereof. Examples of key indicators are received intelligence, rap 
sheet, habits, (family) relations, group affiliations and disclosures. More than one category 
could apply. We also coded the ultimate goal of intervention programs into four groups: 1) 
inhibit radicalization (with not yet radicalized individuals); 2) mitigate radicalization (with 
already radicalized individuals); 3) disconnect the radicalized individual from the radical 
group, and 4) repress radical behavior of individuals through detention. 
Key dimensions targeted by intervention programs were identity (e.g., strengthening 
self-identity), group affiliation (e.g., increase distance to potentially harmful groups), 
emotions (e.g., reduce negative emotions), strengthen self-esteem, opportunities (offer routes 
back to main stream society such as education, work, housing), norms (i.e. re-establish 
acceptance of authorities and societal values), relationships (e.g., re-establish or improve 
family and friendship relations) and knowledge (e.g., enhance insight, awareness and skills 
(e.g., improve social skills). We assessed who funded the execution of intervention programs, 
with the options own organization, own organization in cooperation with public 
(governmental) organization, scientific organization, company, charitable institution, 
volunteer organization, lobby or private individuals, and completely financed by other 
organizations.  
 
Step 3. Determine what defines relations and directions of relationships  
The third step is determining relationships for the content network. Characteristics of 
CVE interventions can be related or unrelated, and the relationship can be based on different 
grounds. In scientific literature, a reported (cor)relation between two or more elements is 
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relations between elements as well, for example based on theoretical assumptions about 
relationships or (shared) expert opinions of scientists. Sources that describe interventions 
could also implicitly link elements, for example by mentioning two elements in the same 
sentence (e.g., physical closeness). Including an indicator to refer to the source of relations 
(e.g., empirically based, based on textual co-occurrence) is central. 
The simplest way for relations data is to describe whether there is a relationship (1) or 
not (0) between two elements. Inclusion of other aspects, such as valence and strength of 
relationships (-1.0 to +1.0), enhances the information quality, and provides metrics that can be 
compared. The resulting data consist of a matrix of all elements related to all elements. This 
can be reformulated in an edge-list, in which each row represents a relationship between any 
two elements. We coded relations that were empirically found or explicitly mentioned. We 
also included relations if elements reasonably co-occurred in the same paragraph, but the 
relation was not mentioned explicitly. In our sample of 99 interventions this resulted in over 
100.000 edges. Table 2 gives the denominators. 
 







Identifier Identification number  1, 2,…n 
Dimension x Database dimension  Evaluation effectiveness 
Element x Dimension x specification  Small 
Relationship xy  Direction, valence and strength of the 
relationship between elements x and y  
+>i 
Relationship quality Type of evidence of the relationship  Empirical 
Dimension y Database dimension other than x Target information 







van den Berg, van Hemert & van Vliet: Creating a Knowledge Base for Interventions 






Step 4. Populate the knowledge base 
The fourth step focuses on the extent and type of the data search. Central decisions are 
determining which data (not) to include and logging the types of searches. Meta-analytic 
theory advices to have two or more coders who independently code all data, or at least code 
partly overlapping samples. Preparation of detailed coding instructions and training sessions 
for coders are useful, as well as discussing difficulties between coders.  
Considering the more illustrative nature of our data collection, we focused on 
interventions mentioned in four reports7. We searched online and offline for detailed 
information about the CVE interventions that were summarized in these reports. We included 
those interventions that had sufficient information and documentation available. Furthermore, 
a questionnaire was sent out to 305 CVE professionals. The content of the questionnaire was 
analogous to the coding scheme of the knowledge base. Twenty-one questionnaires were 
returned. In combination with the coded interventions a total of 99 interventions were 
included in the knowledge base. Four experienced coders started out by coding three 
interventions together. Issues that arose during coding were discussed until agreement was 
met. 
 
Step 5. Perform analyses and visualizations 
Following these steps results in a knowledge base containing frequency data and 
relations data, on which a large variety of analyses can be performed8. To illustrate the type of 
queries that can be done using these data, we describe a sample of findings from the CVE 
                                                 
7 Alex Schmid (2013). “Radicalisation, De-radicalisation Counter-radicalisation: A Conceptual Discussion and Literature 
Review,” ICCT Research Paper, (International Centre for Counter-terrorism – The Hague, 2013); Wijn, R. (2013). What 
matters in counter- and de-radicalization efforts? SAFIRE: Results and Findings of the FP7 Project, 35-41; TNO (2011). 
Evaluations of Interventions (from WP3.1). Synthesis report on the results from WP 3 & 4, 29-32., http://www.safire-project-
results.eu/documents/deliverables/3-4-modeling-culture-indicators-and-intervention-evaluation.pdf; Lousberg, M., Van 
Hemert, D, & Langelaan, S. (2009). Dealing with radicalisation: Options for first-line workers. The Netherlandsederland: 
TNO; Preventing Radicalisation to Terrorism and Violent Extremism: Strengthening the EU’s Response. RAN Collection 
Approaches, lessons learned and practices. First edition 15 January 2014; for the current version: https://ec.europa.eu/home-
affairs/sites/homeaffairs/files/what-we-do/networks/radicalisation_awareness_network/ran-best-
practices/docs/ran_collection-approaches_and_practices_en.pdf  
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interventions knowledge base, focusing on differences between ideologies associated with 
CVE interventions. We start with frequency data.  
Type of ideology targeted by intervention. Do interventions in the knowledge base 
address some ideologies more than others? We assessed in eight (yes/no) questions the extent 
to which intervention programs focused on specific ideologies. Many interventions could be -
partly- described as ‘targeting no specific ideology’ (43% of the responses were affirmative to 
this question). These consist of interventions that are either generally oriented or customized 
toward specific needs of individuals without taking ideologies into account.  
Over a third of the interventions did (also) address Islamic extremism (38% 
affirmative), and 21% of the intervention programs (also) addressed right-wing extremism. 
Fewer interventions aimed at left-wing extremism (nine %), national-separatist extremism 
(six%), ecological activism (four%), and anti-globalism (three%). An open-ended ‘other’ 
category characterized interventions that addressed various other ‘ideologies’, such as 
violence in the name of Christianity and gang involvement (24%).  
Almost one fifth of the interventions addressed more than one ideology. The majority 
of these focused on a combination of Islamic extremism and right-wing extremism (12%). In 
the remainder of this paper, we focus on the three largest ideologies: interventions that 
targeted no specifically ideology, were oriented toward Islamic extremism, or oriented toward 
right-wing extremism. To avoid bias, we included interventions that focused on more than one 
ideology , resulting in non-exclusive groups.  
Type of ideology and type of organization. Does type of targeted ideology differ per 
type of organization? We identified four exclusive types of organizations by level of 
interaction with their ultimate target group (e.g., potential radicals). The largest proportion 
involved professional organizations with direct contact with the target group (56%). The 
second largest was professional organizations with indirect contact with the target group (e.g., 
through front-line workers; 28%). The remaining types of organizations were policy-making 
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A weighted comparison between the two largest groups, professional organizations 
with, and without direct contact with the target groups, demonstrates that there is a different 
distribution of ideologies depending on the type of organization (Figure 1). Of organizations 
in direct contact with potential radicals, a little over a third (34%) addressed no specific 
ideology, 30% targeted Islamic extremism and only nine % targeted right-wing extremism. Of 
organizations with indirect contact with the ultimate target group, 39% of interventions 
targeted no specific ideology, 21% interventions targeting right-wing extremism, and 19% 
interventions targeting Islamic extremism. Thus, there is a different distribution of ideologies 
depending on the type of organization: There are more interventions targeting Islamic 
extremism in organizations with direct contact with the target group, and less in organizations 
with indirect contact with the ultimate target group.  
 
Figure 1. Organizations’ contact with the target group by intervention focus on target-group ideology.  
Determination of eligibility by key dimensions. Which rationale is present for enrolling 
individuals in interventions? Figure 2 shows a weighted word cloud9 of 18 key dimensions 
that could be considered when deciding if people are eligible for intervention programs. More 
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than one indicator could apply. Most used key dimensions by professionals are ‘relations with 
the group individuals are affiliated with’, ‘contacts that individuals have with family or  

















Figure 2. Weighted word cloud of dimensions mentioned to assess vulnerability and eligibility to intervention programs. Size 
of the words refers to how often the indicator was mentioned, ranging from ‘friendship relation’ (15 times mentioned) to 
romantic relations (one time mentioned).  
 
Relatively few interventions used romantic relations, housing issues or travel 
destination as indicators, but we expect that this increased since 2014, considering for 
instance Islamic extremists travelling to Syria. For seven interventions, none of the proposed 
dimensions were applicable. 
Goal of intervention program and relation to ideology. Sixty-two interventions 
provided information about intervention goals. More than one goal could apply. Many 
intervention programs focused on prevention of not-yet radicalized individuals (36%), 
followed by mitigation of already radicalized individuals (28%). Disconnecting radicalized 
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radical behavior (e.g., through detention) occurred in seven %. The remaining 15% focused 
on other goals, such as reducing re-offending by juveniles, and preventing and suppressing 
gang violence.  
Do goals of interventions (prevent, mitigate, disconnect, repress) differ depending on 
interventions targeting different ideologies? Within each ideology, we determined the 
distribution of goals of interventions. Figure 3 demonstrates that for every ideology, prevent 
and mitigate are the most common goals. Interventions focusing on extreme right-wing 
ideologies had as goals to disconnect (working with already radicalized individuals) to a 
larger extent as compared to Islamic extremism, or not ideologically oriented interventions: 
less than a third of the interventions on Islamic extremism or no specific ideology focused 
interventions had ‘disconnect’ as goal.  
Figure 3. Percentage of goal of the intervention (more than one could apply) by interventions focusing on no specific 
ideology, Islamic extremism and right-wing extremism  
 
Key mechanisms targeted by the interventions. Which are the key mechanisms 
targeted by intervention programs? Information about key mechanisms was available for 95 
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(68%) of interventions addressed ‘increasing knowledge’ as a way to achieve their goals. 
‘Extending skills’ (36%) was the second largest key mechanism, followed by ‘other’ key 
mechanisms (35%) (for example building resilience, counter-communication and probation). 
Further key mechanisms were ‘strengthening self-identity’ (29%), ‘offer opportunities such as 
routes back to main-stream society’ (28%), ‘reduce negative emotions and strengthen self-
esteem’ (26%), ‘norms such as re-establish acceptance of authorities and societal values’ 
(25%), ‘re-establish or improve family and friendship relationships’ (22%), and ‘increase 
distance to potentially harmful groups’ (22%). 
 
Figure 4. Percentage of ideology focused on by interventions by key mechanisms addressed by interventions 
We identified key mechanisms of interventions for different ideologies (Figure 4). 
Notable differences are seen between interventions focusing on Islamic - and right-wing 
ideologies and interventions not targeting a specific ideology. Key mechanisms such as 
norms, relationships, skills and emotions are most pronounced for Islamic extremist - or right-
wing extremist ideologies. Interventions not targeting a specific ideology focus on key 
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interventions targeting specific ideologies are associated with more detailed and content-
related key mechanisms as compared to interventions not targeting a specific ideology. 
Key mechanisms targeted by interventions related to start of interventions. Are there 
changes over time in terms of key mechanism targeted? We compared the starting year of the 
interventions with key mechanisms targeted. Information about start of the intervention was 
available for 73 interventions. The earliest year in which an intervention started was 1975. 
Over one-third (35%) of the interventions started at 1-4 years prior to 2014, the year the 
assessment was carried out, and 29% of the interventions started between 2005 and 2009. 
Eighteen percent of the interventions started between 2000 and 2004, and the remaining 18% 
started before 2000. Over the years, we see changes in key mechanisms targeted by 
intervention programs (Table 3). Self-identity as a key mechanism is highest in the more 
recent years 2005-2014. Also notable is the steady increase in the targeting of norms. Other 
key mechanisms did not demonstrate notable deviations over time. 
 
Table 3. Progression over years in focus on key mechanisms targeted by interventions.  
 Before 2000 2000-2004 2005-2009 2010-2014 
Strength of self-
identity  
23% 8% 53% 36% 
Norms 15% 17% 37% 44% 
Note. Percentage of total interventions per period 
 
Intervention activities. How are interventions executed? Of the 99 interventions, 97 
had information about this aspect. More than one of six categories could apply. Many 
interventions used one or more educational activities, such as training (51%) or dialogue 
(42%). Social activities included improving social relationships (20%), involving parents 
(18%), or sports (seven %). Counseling activities applied for some interventions, for example 
individual counseling (19%) and creative activity (eight %). Few punishment activities 
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information campaigns (10%) and dissemination of research results (14%). Forty-eight 
percent (also) mentioned other activities such as giving benefits in prison or getting the 
community involved and field trips. Results show there is much diversity in intervention 
activities and that educational activities such as training are often used. Not many intervention 
activities involved punishment. This is in line with intervention goals, where only a minor 
portion targeted repression. 
Finances and costs. There is not much information available on costs of interventions. 
Of the 99 interventions, there were five interventions that estimated costs of interventions. 
This ranged from 500 to 320.000 euros (annually for seven intervention projects). Information 
on financing was available for 72 interventions. Of these, 49% reported financing by public 
organizations, eight % by private organizations, seven % by charitable institutions and one % 
for scientific organizations, lobby/private individuals and volunteering each. Twenty-eight 
percent of the interventions mentioned other financing, for example crowd funding and EU 
funding.  
Evaluations. Of the 97 interventions that had information on evaluations, 54% 
reported that the intervention was evaluated, 9 % reported that the intervention was not 
evaluated, and 37% reported that at that time there had been no evaluation. For each ideology 
targeted, we found the percentage of non-evaluated interventions to differ: for interventions 
targeting Islamic extremism, the percentage of non-evaluated interventions was 19%, and for 
interventions targeting extreme right-wing extremism this was 14%. Notably the percentage 
of interventions that was not evaluated was smallest for interventions focusing on no specific 
ideology (five %), although for almost half (48%) of the interventions without targeting a 
specific ideology, it was not yet known whether they were going to be evaluated or not. 
Information about the focus of evaluations was available for only 48 interventions. A 
relatively small amount (19%) of the interventions focused on the financial aspects. There 
were different suppliers of the information the evaluations were based on. The biggest 
supplier of information on evaluations were professionals associated with the intervention 
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interventions that were evaluated. The intervention program was evaluated for 61% by the 
organization that developed it. 
Networks. The relations data were analyzed to represent networks of relations between 
the afore-mentioned aspects, using Gephi software10. Gephi is an interactive visualization and 
exploration platform for all kinds of networks in dynamic and hierarchical graphs. It allows 
for visualizing relationships between all aspects, or a subset of aspects.  
As with frequency analyses, in our network representations we focused on three 
ideologies targeted by interventions: Islamic extremism, right-wing extremism and not 
oriented toward a specific ideology. Within each ideology, we selected relations between 
intervention goals, mechanisms used in interventions and effectiveness (small, medium, 
large). We included only those relations that were mentioned ten times or more. As is 
common in network analyses (cf. social network analyses), the dimensions with the highest 
degree of relations with other dimensions are represented in the center of the network, by 
using the correction of Fruchterman and Reingold (1991).  
Figure 5 shows the dimensions most relevant for interventions targeting no specific 
ideology. Interventions targeting no specific ideology aim to inhibit and mitigate 
radicalization and use increasing knowledge, possibilities and competences as mechanisms. 
No dimensions on effectiveness are visible in the network; this means that no strong relations 
between this type of intervention and any level of effectiveness were found.  
                                                 
8 (http://gephi.github.io/). Gephi is an interactive visualization and exploration platform and runs on Windows, Linux and 
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Figure 5. Network of relations between elements of interventions targeting no specific ideology, cut-off score >10. 
Mechanisms of interventions are depicted in green, goals of interventions are depicted in red, effectiveness is depicted in 
purple and ideology is depicted in blue. Size of the nodes corresponds to (in and out) degree, and thickness of the arrows 
corresponds to the strength of the relationship. Position of the nodes corresponds to centrality. Naming of the nodes: First the 
element is named, followed by the corresponding dimension. 
 
Figure 6 shows the most relevant dimensions for interventions focusing on right-wing 
extremism. Interventions targeted at right-wing extremism generally have the goal to 
disengage the radicalized individual from his or her peer group, use an exit-strategy 
mechanism, and have strong effects. Exit programs typically use counternarratives to 
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Figure 6. Network of relations between elements of interventions targeting right-wing extremism, cut-off score >10. 
Mechanisms of interventions are depicted in green, goals of interventions are depicted in red, effectiveness is depicted in 
purple and ideology is depicted in blue. Size of the nodes corresponds to (in and out) degree, and thickness of the arrows 
corresponds to the strength of the relationship. Position of the nodes corresponds to centrality. Naming of the nodes: First the 
element is named, followed by the corresponding dimension. 
 
Figure 7 represents the relations between dimensions of interventions targeting 
extreme Islamism that were mentioned more than 10 times. All intervention goals were 
regularly found, but predominant intervention goals were prevention and disengagement. All 
intervention mechanisms are present; predominant mechanisms are increasing knowledge and 
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Figure 7. Network of relations between elements of interventions targeting Islamic extremism, cut-off score >10. 
Mechanisms of interventions are depicted in green, goals of interventions are depicted in red, effectiveness is depicted in 
purple and ideology is depicted in blue. Size of the nodes corresponds to (in and out) degree, and thickness of the arrows 
corresponds to the strength of the relationship. Position of the nodes corresponds to centrality. Naming of the nodes: First the 
element is named, followed by the corresponding dimension.  
Figures 5-7 demonstrate once more that characteristics of interventions in the 
knowledge base differ depending on ideology targeted. Also, using the same cut-off scores 
results in networks that vary in elaborateness, that cannot -solely- be explained by differences 




This paper focused on construing a knowledge base on CVE interventions. We described a 
five-step method to manage detailed information about CVE interventions and how to 
construct a knowledge base. Advantages of the use of a knowledge base are that information 
can be stored and retrieved as objectively as possible, and that experts can use several 
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knowledge base increases data precision, and creates the opportunity to develop a living 
knowledge base. 
We used two types of data; relatively common frequency data and data of relations 
between CVE intervention aspects. Relations between aspects of CVE interventions were 
included to demonstrate how data can be meaningfully represented in networks to provide 
new insights. Using a sample of CVE interventions, we exemplified different kinds of 
information, ranging from financing CVE interventions to goals and mechanisms used in 
interventions.  
In relatively heterogenic and complex matters, such as CVE interventions, data on 
relations can offer insights that can supplement and extend frequency analyses. Network 
visualizations offer information on which aspects are related, strengths of relationships 
between aspects of CVE interventions, and the number of relationships aspects have with 
other aspects. Visualizations on relations between aspects of CVE interventions offer 
oversight and can broaden viewpoints. Examples of potential analyses for further use are 
cohesiveness and centrality of aspects of CVE interventions. Network theory is now applied 
in several fields, for example in the development of political attitudes (Dalege et al., 2016).  
Dalege, Borsboom, van Harreveld and van der Maas (2017) described how estimation and 
analyses of networks can demonstrate how outcome variables (for example attitude towards 
ideology-based violence or effectiveness of CVE interventions) are influenced by various 
other aspects in the network (for example aspects of interventions). Using this method could 
lead to the use of network theory in hypothesis testing (e.g., to measure effectiveness of CVE 
interventions). The described method in knowledge base construction can be used for issues 
other than CVE interventions, for example for causes of radicalization, research on gangs, or 
criminality or insurgency in general.  
The use of other outlets than empirical journals is worthwhile in a meta-analysis as it 
opens a way to systematically use non-scientific outlets. In all meta-analyses, but especially 
when including non-scientific sources and data, a value should be included for each data point 
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we distinguished theoretical, expert opinion, and empirical type of data. Ideally, a more 
elaborate set of values is included to allow for an estimate of data quality and to shed light on 
the level of bias in the database. As our sample of present data relied on the information that 
was available in scientific as well as non-scientific outlets, the present sample lacks 
randomness and can be accidentally biased. Interpretations of the present findings should be 
done while keeping in mind that they are not a reflection of CVE interventions as such but 
restricted to what was included in the knowledge base. In addition, the correlational structure 
of the data merits caution for causal interpretations.     
As sample outcomes, we described frequency data and data of relations between 
aspects of CVE interventions. We mainly focused on three ideologies: CVE interventions 
targeting Islamic extremism, CVE interventions targeting right-wing extremism and CVE 
interventions targeting no specific ideology. Data of relations demonstrated differences 
between these ideologies that cannot be explained by differences in the number of 
interventions present in the database. Using the same cut-off score, we compared relations 
between goals, mechanisms and effectiveness between the ideologies. This resulted in visibly 
different networks: Whereas the network for CVE interventions focusing on Islamic 
extremism was quite extensive, a much simpler network for CVE interventions focusing on 
right-wing extremism as well as with no specific ideology focus was found. Although the 
simpler network on right-wing extremism could potentially be ascribed to the smaller number 
of CVE interventions in the data, this explanation does not hold for the network of 
interventions targeting no specific ideology, as the number of interventions in the knowledge 
base was largest. The more extensive network seen on interventions targeting Islamic 
extremism represents a broader approach of CVE intervention: Whereas goals, mechanisms 
and effectiveness show relatively simple relations between aspects of CVE interventions 
targeting right-wing extremism and interventions targeting no specific ideology, relations are 
more varied for CVE interventions targeting Islamic extremism. 
In the current sample, we found most CVE interventions targeting no specific 
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extremism. Which aspects of CVE interventions varied as a function of ideology targeted? 
For CVE interventions targeting no specific ideology, predominant goals of CVE 
interventions were inhibit (prevention) and mitigation (of already radicalized people). For 
CVE interventions targeting right-wing extremism, using the same cut-off score, the 
predominant goal of CVE interventions was disengagement from radical groups. CVE 
interventions targeting Islamic extremism predominant goals were inhibit (prevention) and 
disengagement. Thus, although the present sample could be accidentally biased, it is likely 
that the intervention goals differ as a function of ideology targeted.  
In addition, the mechanisms used in CVE interventions seem to vary. For CVE 
interventions targeting no specific ideology, mechanisms were predominantly related to 
increasing knowledge, increasing competences and creating possibilities. For interventions 
targeting right-wing extremism, one mechanism emerged, namely exit strategy. Mechanisms 
used by CVE interventions targeting Islamic extremism are related to increasing knowledge 
and increasing competences, and many others, such as using the social group, dealing with 
emotions, providing possibilities and working on norms and values. 
Taken together, the following pattern may be inferred from the current sample: CVE 
interventions targeting no specific ideology tend to focus on general mechanisms and on early 
stages of radicalization. CVE interventions targeting Islamic extremism also focus on general 
mechanisms but tend to use other mechanisms as well. The predominant mechanisms of right-
wing extremism are disengagement -, more specifically exit strategies. Thus, interventions 
focused on specific ideologies (Islamic extremism, right-wing extremism) tend to use more 
specific mechanisms for CVE interventions.  
Also, a difference between ideologies targeted and the coded effectiveness measures 
emerged. The fact that we found that CVE interventions targeting no specific ideology tend to 
focus on early stages of radicalization could be an explanation for not finding a relation with 
effectiveness measures for this group of CVE interventions. In early stages of radicalization, it 
is difficult to determine who benefitted from interventions and who were otherwise 
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extremism, we did find a relation with effectiveness measures. For CVE interventions 
targeting Islamic extremism, relations with effectiveness varied from weak to strong. For 
CVE interventions targeting right-wing extremism a relation with strong effectiveness was 
found. The pattern of relationships for CVE interventions targeting right-wing extremism, 
showing strong effectiveness, disengagement as a goal, and exit strategies as a mechanism, 
reflects a particularity in the data and arguably current literature on CVE interventions 
targeting right-wing extremism. In it, we found a strong prevalence of data on exit strategies 
propagated by Exit Germany, which reflect a relative homogeneity of interventions for 
extreme right ideologies. This could also be a reflection of a successful reporting policy on 
effectiveness studies by programs like Exit Germany. The ability to compare the effectiveness 
of CVE interventions does rest on the availability of data on effectiveness. Various ways have 
been suggested to improve current practice in effectiveness studies (Feddes and Gallucci, 
2015; Koehler, 2016).  
A notable finding is the lack of information about intervention financial costs. 
Although professionals in the radicalization domain did indicate that costs are one of the 
prime points of interest in interventions, there seems to be a lack of insight and transparency 
about what intervention costs are. For the sources of financing of interventions more 
information was available. Nearly half of the CVE interventions in our sample were being 
financed by public organizations. Our results indicate that evaluations could improve by 
considering financial or economic resources in relation to outputs, outcomes, or impacts. 
Other improvements on evaluations are related to the finding that 61% of the evaluations were 
executed by the organizations that developed the CVE interventions, which makes them 
vulnerable to overly positive evaluations. Ways to prevent bias in evaluations are to outsource 
evaluations to independent parties, or to follow traceable predetermined evaluation 
assessments.  
Other recommendations include a need for evaluations of CVE interventions and 
studies on effectiveness that include relations between investments and outcomes. Whereas a 
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could guide choices of which interventions to use in what circumstances. General availability 
of effectiveness information, but also other information about CVE interventions helps to 
decide what is relevant given the target group and other relevant aspects. It is advocated to 
outsource studies on effectiveness to research organizations because institutes performing the 
CVE interventions often lack both financial resources and expertise to execute thorough 
evaluations. In addition, this reduces the risk of self-serving outcomes. Finally, the lack of 
databases on counter-violent extremism interventions should be addressed by further 

























van den Berg, van Hemert & van Vliet: Creating a Knowledge Base for Interventions 








Ballou M. (1995). Psychological Interventions: A guide to Strategies. Praeger 
Publishers/Greenwood Publishing Group, Inc: Westport, CT, USA. 
Bhui, K. S., Hicks, M. H., Lashley, M., & Jones, E. (2012). A public health approach to 
understanding and preventing violent radicalisation. BMC medicine, 10(1), 16. 
Bowie, N. G. (2017). Terrorism Events Data: An Inventory of Databases and Data Sets, 1968-
2017. Perspectives on Terrorism, 11(4). 
Bossong, R. (2014). EU cooperation on terrorism prevention and violent radicalisation: 
frustrated ambitions or new forms of EU security governance? Cambridge Review of 
International Affairs, 27(1), 66-82. 
Carley, K.M., & Kamneva, N.Y. (2004). A Network Optimization Approach for Improving 
Organizational Design. Carnegie Mellon University, School of Computer Science, 
Institute for Software Research International, Technical Report CMU-ISRI-04-102. 
Cooper, H., Hedges, L. V., Valentine, J. C. (Eds.). (2009). The Handbook of Research 
Synthesis and Meta-Analysis, Second Edition. New York: Russell Sage.  
Cramer, A.O.J., Waldorp, L.J., van der Maas, H.L.J., & Borsboom. D. (2010). Comorbidity: a 
network perspective. Behavioral and Brain Sciences, 33(2-3), 137-150.  
Dalege, J., Borsboom, D., van Harreveld, F., van den Berg, H., Conner, M., & van der Maas, 
H. L. (2016). Toward a formalized account of attitudes: The Causal Attitude Network 
(CAN) model. Psychological review, 123(1), 2. 
Dalege, J., Borsboom, D., van Harreveld, F., & van der Maas, H. L. (2017). Network analysis 
on attitudes: A brief tutorial. Social psychological and personality science, 8(5), 528-
537. 
Doosje, B., Moghaddam, F. M., Kruglanski, A. W., de Wolf, A., Mann, L., & Feddes, A. R. 
(2016). Terrorism, radicalisation and de-radicalisation. Current Opinion in 






van den Berg, van Hemert & van Vliet: Creating a Knowledge Base for Interventions 






Epskamp, S., Cramer, A.O.J., Waldorp, L. J., Schmittmann, V. D., & Borsboom, D. (2012). 
Qgraph: Network visualizations of relationships in psychometric data. Journal of 
Statistical Software, 48(4), 1-18. 
Feddes, A. R., & Gallucci, M. (2015). A literature review on methodology used in evaluating 
effects of preventive and de-radicalisation interventions. Journal for Deradicalisation, 
5(4), 1-27. 
Fruchterman, T. M., & Reingold, E. M. (1991). Graph drawing by force‐directed placement. 
Software: Practice and experience, 21(11), 1129-1164. 
Gielen, A. J. (2017). Countering Violent Extremism: A Realist Review for Assessing What 
Works, for Whom, in What Circumstances, and How? Terrorism and Political 
Violence, 1-19. 
Horgan, J. (2009). Walking away from terrorism: Accounts of disengagement from radical 
and extremist movements. Routledge, New York.  
Hunter, J.E., & Schmidt, F.L. (2004). Methods of Meta-Analysis: Correcting Error and Bias 
in Research Findings. Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage. 
Ioannidis, J. P., Greenland, S., Hlatky, M. A., Khoury, M. J., Macleod, M. R., Moher, D., & 
Tibshirani, R. (2014). Increasing value and reducing waste in research design, 
conduct, and analysis. The Lancet, 383, 166-175. 
Johnson, D. H., & Sabourin, M. E. (2001). Universally accessible databases in the 
advancement of knowledge from psychological research. International Journal of 
Psychology, 36(3), 212-220. 
Koehler, D. (2016). Understanding Deradicalisation: Methods, Tools and Programs for 
Countering Violent Extremism. London, Taylor & Francis. 
Koehler, D. (2014). German Right-Wing Terrorism in Historical Perspective. A First 
Quantitative Overview of the ‘Database on Terrorism in Germany (Right-Wing 






van den Berg, van Hemert & van Vliet: Creating a Knowledge Base for Interventions 






Krackhart, D., & Carley, K.M. (1998). A PCANS model of structure in organizations. In: 
International Symposium on Command and Control Research and Technology, 
Monterey, CA. 
Munafò, M. R., Nosek, B. A., Bishop, D. V., Button, K. S., Chambers, C. D., du Sert, N. P., 
…& Ioannidis, J. P. (2017). A manifesto for reproducible science. Nature Human 
Behaviour, 1, 0021.  
Mook, D. G. (2001). Psychological research: The ideas behind the methods. London: Norton. 
Ritchey, T. (2011a) Wicked Problems – Social Messes: Decision support Modelling with 
Morphological Analysis. Berlin: Springer. 
Ritchey, T. (2011b). Decision Support Modelling with Morphological Analysis Series: Risk, 
Governance and Society, 17. Springer Science & Business Media. 
Schuurman, B. (2018). Research on Terrorism, 2007–2016: A Review of Data, Methods, and 
Authorship. Terrorism and Political Violence, DOI: 10.1080/09546553.2018.1439023. 
Yardley, L., Morrison, L., Bradbury, K., & Muller, I. (2015). The person-based approach to 
intervention development: application to digital health-related behavior change 























van den Berg, van Hemert & van Vliet: Creating a Knowledge Base for Interventions 










About the JD Journal for Deradicalization 
 
The JD Journal for Deradicalization is the world’s only peer reviewed periodical for the 
theory and practice of deradicalization with a wide international audience. Named an 
“essential journal of our times” (Cheryl LaGuardia, Harvard University) the JD’s editorial 
board of expert advisors includes some of the most renowned scholars in the field of 
deradicalization studies, such as Prof. Dr. John G. Horgan (Georgia State University); Prof. 
Dr. Tore Bjørgo (Norwegian Police University College); Prof. Dr. Mark Dechesne (Leiden 
University); Prof. Dr. Cynthia Miller-Idriss (American University Washington); Prof. Dr. 
Julie Chernov Hwang (Goucher College); Prof. Dr. Marco Lombardi, (Università Cattolica 
del Sacro Cuore Milano); Dr. Paul Jackson (University of Northampton); Professor Michael 
Freeden, (University of Nottingham); Professor Hamed El-Sa'id (Manchester Metropolitan 
University); Prof. Sadeq Rahimi (University of Saskatchewan, Harvard Medical School), Dr. 
Omar Ashour (University of Exeter), Prof. Neil Ferguson (Liverpool Hope University), Prof. 
Sarah Marsden (Lancaster University), Dr. Kurt Braddock (Pennsylvania State University), 
Dr. Michael J. Williams (Georgia State University), and Aaron Y. Zelin (Washington Institute 
for Near East Policy). 
 
 










Editors in Chief: Daniel Koehler, Tine Hutzel 
                                                 
 
